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Abstract
The transition from a socialist economy to one of capitalism brought, to many countries 
that had previously been socialist, a drastic decline in their technological competences, 
technological transfers, and research activities after the 1990s. This research seeks to 
assess whether or not the policy of technology transfer practised during the socialist era 
improved for these countries following their entry to a capitalist regime and their subse-
quent joining of the European Union, and whether or not these two processes (which his-
torically coincide for many previously socialist countries) correlate. Croatia is used as an 
example of a typical transition country possessive of a specific type of market socialism, 
with controversial outcomes arising from its particular transition process in comparison to 
its peers. Despite the assistance of the European Union, which helped many new members 
from socialist backgrounds to recover their economies by upgrading their technological 
capabilities, this research reveals that technology transfer in less technologically developed 
countries is unfolding very slowly. Technological transfer occurs as a highly contextual 
phenomenon, dependant not only on the structure of the economy and technological and 
research capacities, but also on the political economy and the type of capitalism. This 
research identifies the three phases of the evolution of university technology transfer: sci-
ence based models in socialism; endeavours towards an innovation based model throughout 
the transition period; and the bureaucratic model, driven by the EU cohesion policy and 
facilitated through access to the European Structural Funds. This research points out that 
bureaucratic-driven types of technology transfer should be coupled with nationally con-
cerned actions on overall economic and political reforms in order to gain efficient results 
from their technology transfer efforts.
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1 Introduction
With the international economic integration and global saturation of commodities of all 
kinds, the generation and exploitation of both technological and service innovations are 
widely recognised today as the key driving force for long-term socio-economic develop-
ment. The future development of all contemporary economies, including those in post-
socialist countries, is highly dependent on their capacity to generate and exploit various 
types of innovation and their ability to transfer knowledge and new technologies from the 
scientific sphere to production, and vice versa. Technology transfer has many different 
meanings and there is an abundance of multidisciplinary literature on this topic (Wahab 
et  al. 2012; Bozeman et  al. 2015). Scholars’ understanding of what is important in the 
management of knowledge and technology transfer has evolved continuously, but scien-
tific research, innovation and, recently, entrepreneurship are considered to be inseparably 
intertwined with technology transfer (Audretsch et al. 2012). While some think that tech-
nology transfer is all about technological and managerial learning in companies, growing 
numbers of scholars since the 1990s have become increasingly more preoccupied with uni-
versity technology transfer (UTT) (Allen and O’Shea 2014; López Mendoza and Mauricio 
Sanchez 2018; Breznitz and Etzkowitz 2016), which usually involves the commercializa-
tion of research results, different models of science/industry cooperation, and academic 
entrepreneurship. This approach has resulted in a large expansion of literature in this area, 
and this was mainly inspired by the ideas of the third university mission, initiated by the 
third university revolution (Etzkowitz and Viale 2010), the model of the triple helix (Etz-
kowitz 2008), academic capitalism (Slaughter and Leslie 2001; Rhoades and Slaughter 
1997), and entrepreneurial university (Gibb and Hannon 2006; Silva et  al. 2018). These 
theories and ideas have found fruitful grounds for policy applications in European develop-
ment strategies; firstly within the Lisbon agenda (European Commission 2000) and most 
recently within the smart specialization strategy (S3) (Foray et al. 2009; Radošević et al. 
2018), which established the concept of entrepreneurial university and figured university 
technology transfer as a fundamental mechanism to spur regional economic growth.
Following this, technology transfer in this study addresses the processes of knowledge 
transfer from the scientific to the business sector, and all types of academic engagement 
involving the cooperation of the science with industry (Perkmann et al. 2013; Breznitz and 
Feldman 2010). It goes beyond the pure commercialization of research results and involves 
both formal and informal channels of knowledge transfer between academics and stake-
holders within an innovation system. Miller et al. (2018) identified, for example, thirteen 
types of modes of engagement to encourage academics to participate in knowledge transfer 
ranging from the level of formality, to networking, to spin-outs; while (Dabić et al. 2016) 
identified the eight basic functions of an entrepreneurial university, of which technology 
transfer was one of the most prominent.
The key research questions addressed in this article are whether or not the transition to 
capitalism and membership in the EU changed the university technology transfer model 
practised in the socialist era and, if so, in what direction; whether the academic knowledge 
and research was infused into valuable economic activity and marketable innovation that 
would foster entrepreneurial innovation, or not; and whether knowledge transfer and the 
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propensity to engage in entrepreneurship following capitalism were enhanced and, if not, 
why?
This research was conducted using Croatia as its subject: the newest, 28th EU member 
state as of 2013, and a country with controversial outcomes of the transition process in 
comparison to its peers. This controversy stems from the fact that Croatia was much more 
prepared for market economy in 1990s, and had numerous advantages over countries from 
socialistic blocks, in terms of price liberalisation, foreign trade liberalisation, and reforma-
tion of the banking system (Uvalić 2018), leaving other Eastern European countries, at 
that time, behind. Nowadays, by contrast, Croatia is one of the least developed EU mem-
ber states, lagging behind its eastern peers in growth rates of GDP and competitiveness of 
economy. It remains an upper middle-income country, with a GDP per capita of 11.806 
EUR in 2017,1 which achieved around 60% of the EU-28 average, however future eco-
nomic prospects are ambiguous.
This research is conceptual, using the case study of Croatia to better understand how 
technology transfer and entrepreneurial innovation are determined by the political econ-
omy in a national context. The arguments in this article are three-fold. Firstly, we argue 
that UTT has not essentially changed today in comparison to socialism, as the socio-eco-
nomic context remains adverse to innovation and entrepreneurialism, despite its transfor-
mation to capitalism. Secondly, we argue that UTT has evolved through three models since 
socialism: the science-based model practiced in socialism; the innovation based model in 
transition; and the bureaucratic model of today. Thirdly, we argue that the current bureau-
cratic UTT model is driven by the Europeanization of national research and innovation 
policies, embodied in the smart specialization strategy, and in certain aspects of regression 
with regards to the two previous phases of UTT.
The article is structured as follows: in the next four sections the historical evolution and 
the main features of UTT are described, following on from socialism (Sect. 2), over the 
first (Sect. 3) and second (Sect. 4) phase of transition, to the present state of Europeaniza-
tion of UTT (Sect. 5). Discussion of the results of the research is given in Sect. 6, leading 
on to some concluding remarks in Sect. 7.
2  Theoretical framework
Schumpeter (1942) and Drucker (1985) posited entrepreneurial innovation as the source 
of productivity growth. This approach cultivated a view in which innovation and entrepre-
neurship were virtual synonyms which could be used interchangeably (Acs and Audretsch 
2005), which had a negative collateral effect on the entrepreneurship. The term ‘entrepre-
neurship’ almost disappeared from the European scholarly agenda from the early twentieth 
century to the 1980s. The focus, in this period, was orientated towards science-based inno-
vation and high technology sectors, carried out by large corporations and research insti-
tutes. The analytical framework used to study innovation was the national system of inno-
vation (Nelson 1993); a concept conceived within the evolutionary economy (Nelson and 
Winter 1982) which focused on the institutions and structures that would foster research-
based innovation (Edquist and Lundvall 1993) in which an entrepreneur was absent or per-
sonified in big industries and large corporations (Autio et al. 2014; Acs et al. 2014).
1 http://www.hnb.hr/en/stati stics /main-macro econo mic-indic ators .
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This concept of entrepreneurship was productive in the post-war economic regimes of 
the managed economy, but significantly changed with the massive downsizing and restruc-
turing of many large firms, which gave rise to entrepreneurial economy (Thurik et al. 2013) 
and brought individual entrepreneurs to the centre of the innovation system (Acs et  al. 
2017). Scholars gathered around the GEDI project (Global Entrepreneurship and Develop-
ment Index) (Szerb et al. 2013a, b), which established the theoretical foundation of entre-
preneurship capital (Audretsch 2007); entrepreneurship society and economy (Thurik et al. 
2013); and the national system of entrepreneurship (European Commission 1995; Szerb 
et al. 2013a, b; Acs et al. 2014), which essentially replaced the national innovation system. 
These concepts, along with the construction of entrepreneurship as a separate research field 
(Carlsson et al. 2013; Landström and Harirchi 2018), marked the rise of a new era of entre-
preneurial economy in which entrepreneurship re-emerged as a key agenda of economic 
policy.
However, a gap between entrepreneurship based on the narrow types of science-based 
innovation, which take place at technological frontiers (Autio et  al. 2014, p. 1099), and 
traditional entrepreneurship simply based on new ventures neglecting technological inno-
vation, still persists. The first type of entrepreneurship was inherent to a managed economy, 
while the latter is implicit in entrepreneurial economy. Traditional entrepreneurialism, 
which is often likened to just “another shop around the corner” (Block et al. 2013, p. 713), 
lacks the innovation dimension and has previously been seen to threaten technological 
progress and economic growth in the long run (Shane 2009). Discussions concerning the 
exploitation of new knowledge within the knowledge spill-over theory of entrepreneurship 
(KBST) (Audretsch and Caiazza 2016) and knowledge-driven entrepreneurial economy 
(Audretsch and Link 2018) definitely have a place within this context.
On the other hand, it seems that a concept of entrepreneurial innovation that has recently 
entered the academic fora (González-Cruz and Devece 2018) could bridge the aforemen-
tioned gap, as entrepreneurial innovation assumes opportunity driven businesses (Mroze-
wski and Kratzer 2017) with a high potential for growth (Guerrero, and Urbano 2017). 
Entrepreneurial innovation is focused, as well as summarized by Autio et  al. (2014, p. 
1105), on radical innovation, and can generate growth without necessarily involving scien-
tific research and infrastructures, which is a rather illusive feat for many entrepreneurs. Its 
nature and performance is determined by the different contexts of entrepreneurial innova-
tion ecosystems (industrial, organizational, temporal, etc.), which generate different types 
of entrepreneurial innovation.
However, it seems that the concept of entrepreneurial innovation is still theoretically and 
analytically vague and remains insufficiently distinctive from other forms of entrepreneur-
ship. This entrepreneurship innovation is discussed from many angles such as: the narrative 
perspective of contextualizing innovation through relational, temporal, and performative 
efforts (Garud et al. 2014); its role for emerging economics within the model of the triple 
helix (Guerrero and Urbano 2017); interaction between opportunity and necessity entrepre-
neurship (Mrozewski and Kratzer 2017); its role in regional competitiveness and entrepre-
neurial university (Guerrero et al. 2016); the intelligence of the intellectual class (Burhan 
et al. 2017); and governance quality and economic freedom in the EU (Ignatov 2017), to 
name but a few of the theoretical approaches.
Following the ideas of Guerrero and Urbano (2017) and (Guerrero et al. 2016), entre-
preneurial innovation can be understood to be a new technology entrepreneurship initiative 
which involves different kinds of university technology transfer (cooperative search, busi-
ness incubation, etc.) and cooperative knowledge generation, through models such as that 
of the triple helix (Etzkowitz 2008).
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When it comes to transition economies, it could be argued that the entrepreneurial inno-
vation or commercial exploitation of knowledge hardly exists (Kornai 2010; Švarc 2014; 
Krammer 2009). Croatia suffers from the same shortcomings in terms of innovation and 
entrepreneurship regardless of its transition to capitalism and irrespective of its embracing 
of the principle of entrepreneurial economy (Thurik et al. 2013).
These reasons can be found in the inheritance of socialism and, on the other hand, in 
the particular processes of entrepreneurship development in the transition period. Dur-
ing socialism, private ownership was largely discouraged because it signified alienation 
from “social ownership” and compromised the principals of self-managing socialism (see 
the next section). When the planned economy collapsed, the population inherited slacked 
entrepreneurship capital (Audretsch 2007, 2018) and lacked entrepreneurial experience, 
skills, and institutions (Estrin and Mickiewicz 2011), which made the transition a night-
mare (Ignatov 2017).
While the practice of university technological transfer largely relied on the legacy, prac-
tice, and scientific technological resources of ex-Yugoslavia, the development of entrepre-
neurship was rather uncharted territory. With no historical foundation, entrepreneurship 
has been developing according to two different plans. The first plan involved a new type 
of “political entrepreneurship” (Kshetri 2009) driven by tycoons’ non-transparent privati-
zation of state enterprises, which led to today’s crony capitalism (Franicevic and Bicanic 
2007). Crony capitalism has had a disastrous impact on innovation dynamism and pro-
innovation culture as it is considered to be a speculative (often criminal) form of entrepre-
neurship which displaces productive and innovation-based businesses. Innovation has lost 
its plausibility, social value and, economical effectiveness (Švarc 2017).
The second plan was developed quite separately from the privatization process and 
included the development of new small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). This new 
sector was encouraged by public policies, strategies, laws, and regulations, and through 
the state supporting programmes where integration with the European Union played a key 
role. The process started with the adoption of the European Charter for Small Enterprises 
in 2003, which recommended ten key policy areas of action to support SMEs. The imple-
mentation of this was subjected to regular monitoring and evaluations (Švarc 2014). Owing 
to the Europeanization of entrepreneurship policy, Croatia put in place the basic legal 
and regulatory frameworks for SMEs rather quickly. The government started the nation-
wide “Business impulse” programme to develop business capacities and support primar-
ily traditional types of businesses. However, the technological and innovation capacities 
of the firms were rather neglected (mainly limited in terms of their acquisition of the new 
equipment) and involved quite limited relationships with universities as a source of busi-
ness competitiveness. Therefore, neither crony or “political” entrepreneurship nor the new 
SMEs sector nurtured entrepreneurial innovation. University technology transfer has devel-
oped along its own path, which is presented in the next sections with reference to entrepre-
neurship innovation where appropriate.
3  UTT in socialism and the position of Croatia in ex‑Yugoslavia
There is a vast amount of literature concerning the rise and fall of eastern socialistic 
economies, including Croatia and ex-Yugoslavia (Bartllet 2003; Dyker 2011; Dyker and 
Vejvoda 2014), as well as numerous case studies on particular countries’ transitions of 
 J. Švarc, M. Dabić 
1 3
research and innovation systems following socialism, which are well summarized in 
Meske (Meske 2000a, b) and Dyker and Radošević (1999).
It is commonly perceived that industries in Croatia within ex-Yugoslavia have grown 
very quickly following the Second World War, when large industrial corporations were 
extended or founded, such as Podravka (food), Pliva (pharmacy), Rade Končar (elec-
trical equipment), RIZ (electronics), Nikola Tesla (telecommunications), and Đuro 
Đaković (machinery), to mention only a few. In some technological sectors, ex-Yugo-
slavia has kept pace with developed western countries, and even exported technical ser-
vices to Arab countries (Radošević 1994). Croatia was one of the six republics of Yugo-
slavia and, with the exception of Slovenia, was the most developed republic, boasting a 
relatively strong industrial base. According to some estimations (Stipetić 2012), Croatia 
had its greatest GDP growth between 1950 and 1973 and, at the end of this period, even 
surpassed countries within Central Europe, such as Hungary and Poland, and was only 
eclipsed by Czechoslovakia and Slovenia.
Most large corporations had in-house research institutes, which cooperated with dif-
ferent faculties and with the largest Croatian institute for natural sciences—Institute 
Ruđer Bošković—which was established in the 1950s for nuclear research. However, 
the knowledge-orientated basis for the development of proprietary technologies was 
insufficient, and thus the import of foreign technologies was the basis of technological 
development. The type of imported technology depended on the technological matu-
rity of the sector and varied from low technological loan jobs in the textile industry, to 
various licence contracts, consultations, and know-how, to the acquisition of complete 
“turn-key” services.
Nevertheless, it is important to stress the specific role that science plays in ideology and 
in the politics of socialistic economies, including those within Croatia. It is considered to 
be an important condition for economic development and is the main element of histori-
cal competition with the West (Meske 2000a). Science thus receives a lot of support from 
the government, including in-house industrial institutes, which sometimes result in the 
over-extension of research staff. When it comes to science-industry cooperation and knowl-
edge transfer, it is commonly agreed that the East and West have developed according to 
radically different logics (Hanson and Pavitt 1987; Högselius 2003). The main difference 
between the East and West is that innovation in the East was not spontaneously driven by 
the interest of stakeholders, but was centrally coordinated by the state, limiting the mutual 
co-evolution of industry and science in creating technical change. This substantial differ-
ence is a logical consequence of the political economy of socialism and capitalism, as a 
socialistic economy is based on the central planning of economy and state paternalism 
(the paternalistic relationship between the state and the firm) rather than market competi-
tion and private initiatives. This considerably reduced the willingness of companies and 
research institutes to respond to market incentives through innovation and marketable 
research. The central planning of innovation resulted in the fragmentation of the innovation 
system, which prevented the integration of R&D and production and inter-organisational 
learning.
Another essential fault of technological policy in socialism was the supposedly linear 
model of innovation (in which innovation takes place in consecutive phases from research 
to invention and innovation) or the science-push approach, which established science as 
the primary instigator of innovation and technological change. It is often forgotten that the 
science-based model of innovation was not only a dominant theoretical model in the West, 
in the period from the Second World War to the 1970s, but was also practiced by compa-
nies (Balconi et al. 2010, p. 3).
The Croatian path from socialism to European membership through…
1 3
The remaining shortcomings include the absence of small firms or “specialised sup-
pliers”, very few technological trajectories, and a lack of appropriate selection environ-
ments (Hanson and Pavitt 1987); as well as imbalances between production capacities and 
absorptive capacities, technological obsolescence of equipment, imbalances in the produc-
tion chain, and others (Radošević 1994).
Although Croatia shared the majority of these shortcomings with other countries of the 
Soviet bloc, its system of innovation had certain advantages compared to the Soviet sys-
tem. Croatia, as a part of ex-Yugoslavia, developed a network of relatively strong mission-
oriented public and industrial research institutes, this was a stark contrast to the Soviet 
model, in which the Academy of Sciences was a superior scientific institution and the main 
producer of basic research. Besides. Yugoslavia developed specific workers’ self-managing 
socialism and, within it, a specific institutional set-up for science-industry cooperation—
“the self-managing interest communities for science”—whose purpose was to lead sci-
ence policy from a republic level, and mediate the “labour exchange” between suppliers 
(research organizations) and recipients of science (industry). In this way, research organi-
zations in Croatia were funded from the state and from the production sector in two ways: 
via the “direct exchange of work” (direct contract with industry), or via “indirect exchange 
of work” mediated by the self-managed interest communities for science. Regardless of 
the efficiency of this funding, this shows that the government of ex-Yugoslavia has been 
aware, since the 1970s, of the importance of supporting the “links between knowledge and 
economic development” (IDIS 1980, p. 12), and has sought to encourage the “exchange of 
work” between research and industry. According to some estimations (Pisk 2001), “Insti-
tute Rudjer Boskovic” in 1989 accounted for 40% of its funds from the production sector, 
including the army, but these funds were reduced in 1999 to only 13%. As we shall illus-
trate, such levels of science/industry cooperation would not be achieved in later periods, 
even up to the present.
4  Methodology
A longitudinal case study approach is used in this research to analyse the evolution of 
university technology transfer and its relation to entrepreneurial innovation over the last 
30 years, during the transition from socialism to capitalism. It offers a discussion of the 
evolution of the UTT and entrepreneurial innovation from socialism to the current Euro-
peanization of the technology transfer policies, through the historical overview of the three 
phases of UTT evolution, exemplified by Croatia.
The research includes the analysis of a number of strategic documents, laws, pro-
grammes, regulations, and reports on scientific and innovation policies in Croatia, from 
the mid-1990s to the most recent S3 strategy, supported by statistical data (e.g. Eurostat) 
and other relevant data from international resources (e.g. GEM, Doing Business Indict-
ors) to capture main actors, funding trends, and policies regarding technology transfer and 
innovation challenges. This approach provides a theoretical insight and a critical reflection 
concerning the meaning of technology transfer and entrepreneurial innovation in differ-
ent socio-economic contexts over time. Important resources include the country reports of 
OECD, World Bank, and the European Union (such as Erawatch/RIO reports) since their 
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commencement in 2006,2 as well as the recent HEInnovate background report carried out 
in 2018 by Dabić for the OECD/EC.
5  Findings
5.1  First phase of transition: policy learning and establishing initial infrastructures
Croatia became an independent state of ex-Yugoslavia in 1991, at which point it begun its 
journey towards a modern capitalist economy. During the first turbulent decade of its inde-
pendence, Croatia laid the foundations for new state institutions, exchanged its single-party 
system for parliamentary democracy, created its own new currency, repaired large-scale 
homeland war damages, and initiated reforms for its transition to a market economy.
The Croatian R&D sector has undergone, like all post-socialist countries, a similar pro-
cess of restructuring, ranging from “shock without therapy” (Radosevic 1996) to a gradual 
restructuring of research infrastructures and the organization of science activities. The sci-
ence base in Croatia, in terms of both human/resource capacities and investment in R&D, 
has shrank significantly (Prpić 2003) but the old socialist elitist approach to science, along 
with the linear model of innovation, helped to preserve the national knowledge base of pub-
lic R&D during this turbulent transition period while the national economy was brought to 
ruin. In contrast, industrial R&D has undergone serious deterioration, corresponding with 
low-levels of absorption capacity in firms in terms of research and technology transfer. In 
line with the tremendous loss of industrial production during the 1990s, mainly due to the 
breakdown of export markets during the process of the privatization of state owned com-
panies, many leading technological companies (with 50 years of accumulated knowledge 
and technological competences) collapsed or were absorbed by foreign companies. These 
losses in industrial production in sectors with higher levels of technology content can be 
considered as one of the most severe transformations, with devastating consequences on 
technological development and transfer. Supply and demand for R&D and technological 
development either vanished or was greatly reduced. This process is perceived by soci-
ologists as the “empty-shell model” of privatization (Županov 2001), which denotes the 
extraction of the company’s substance by tycoons and corrupt managers, usually culminat-
ing in the devastation of a company’s fixed assets and technological competences.
Similar devastation processes were also present in other post-socialist countries (Poland, 
Hungary, Slovenia, etc.) but these were mitigated by the countries’ membership in the EU 
and through their integration into the European techno-economic networks. Unlike these 
countries, Croatia was disabled by this process due to homeland war and the subsequent 
isolation of the European integration process until 2013. R&D and innovation were not 
the focus of the governmental agenda, as it was expected that innovation and technology 
development would be generated spontaneously as the result of companies’ privatization, 
macroeconomic stabilization, and trade liberalization (the holy trinity of transition). The 
fact that technology transfer was not an automatic and spontaneous process, which would 
follow from foreign direct investments and market liberalization, was overlooked. Instead, 
endogenous research and technological capacities, together with private initiative and 
entrepreneurial activities (which were suppressed during socialism) were needed.
2 Available at: https ://rio.jrc.ec.europ a.eu/en/count ry-analy sis/Croat ia/count ry-repor t.
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From a global perspective, the shift in modes of technology transfer in the late 1980s 
from cross-national technology transfer, especially from industrialized nations to less 
developed nations, towards domestic technology transfer, can be linked to the need for a 
more pro-active role of the state in supporting new technologies and national competitive-
ness (Bozeman et al. 2015). Policies concerning the theory and practice of innovation and 
knowledge-based growth became a significant objective for policy-makers in the early 
1990s (Mytelka and Smith 2002), and Croatia was no exception to this, particularly with 
regard to the evolutionary theory of technological change (Nelson and Winter 1982) and 
the concept of the national system of innovation (Freeman 1988). Both of these concepts 
perceive innovation as a phenomenon endogenous to society and economy, a social con-
struct (OECD 1992) which requires an appropriate institutional support and deliberate pol-
icy actions to facilitate the smooth flow of knowledge between different sectors, primarily 
industries and universities. The most attractive of these was the concept for an innovation 
system in which the competitiveness of a nation does not depend on the scale of R&D, but 
rather “[…] upon the way in which the available resources are managed and organised” 
(OECD 1992:80). It provides a hope that even a small country with limited resources, like 
Croatia, could make rapid progress and technologically leapfrog. South Korea, Ireland, and 
Finland serve as examples of this.
The learning of policies and the beginning of the Croatian innovation system can be 
traced back to the mid-1990s, when the Ministry of Science and Technology (today Min-
istry of Science and Education) made efforts to transfer advanced “Western” models of 
science/industry cooperation and financial support to innovative small and medium-sized 
enterprises. Technical assistance projects with Germany and Italy provided necessary 
expert knowledge for the modernization of Croatia’s technological policies and technology 
transfer (Lange and Švarc 1994).3 This first phase of launching the Croatian innovation 
system, which lasted until 2000, was focused mainly on technological infrastructures and 
resulted in the establishment of the first technology innovation centres in three university 
cities, Zagreb, Split, and Rijeka, closely followed by Osijek and Dubrovnik. These centres 
are still in function but now operate on more commercial principles.
Importantly, cooperation with Italy resulted in the establishment of the Business Innova-
tion Centre of Croatia (BICRO), the pillar institution of the whole innovation system, with 
a mission to create financial models and instruments to support innovative or research-
based entrepreneurship and allow for possible evolution into the national development 
agency (like, for example, the IDA in Ireland). This has, unfortunately, never happened. 
BICRO passed many organizational and structural transformations, however it ceased to be 
in 2014 when it was merged with the Croatian Agency for Small Business, Innovation, and 
Investment (HAMAG). This large agency had little over a hundred employees, whose main 
task was to implement programmes funded by the ESIF within the cohesion policy of the 
EU.
HAMAG-BICRO also provided support to Technology Transfer Offices in Croatia (TTO 
Programme). The programme was focused on strengthening the role of TTOs in universi-
ties and public research institutions, as these represent central locations for encouraging 
and conducting technology transfer activities. The programme was funded from the budget 
for STP II, which was funded by the WB loan. Currently there are five TTOs in Croatia, all 
3 The projects were made within bilateral cooperation of the Ministry and the German Federal Ministry of 
Research, Science, Education and Technology using the expertise of FhG-ISI, Karlsruhe and VDI/VDE-IT, 
Berlin and with the Business Innovation Centre Friuli -Venezia Giulia, Trieste.
 J. Švarc, M. Dabić 
1 3
with the main objective of providing support to researchers in public science organisations 
in every phase of technology implementation, including the identification of ideas, market 
potential, the processes of protection and commercialisation of IP, and the establishment of 
spin-off/spin-out companies.
5.2  Second phase: the “golden age” of the innovation‑driven mode of UTT 
The second phase of establishing the Croatian innovation system was marked by the launch 
of a programme called HITRA in 2001 (MoST 2002). This was the first nationwide gov-
ernment programme in innovation policy-making. It was a reflection of the desire of the 
new left-oriented government, who won power in the 2000 elections, to give momentum to 
innovation and technology development. HITRA was “a sort of diversion among the elitist-
type oriented scientist while, for entrepreneurs, it was just a new trendy initiative of public 
administration with no significance for the real business” (Švarc 2011, p. 145). HITRA 
treats the national innovation system as a complex dynamic structure, wherein a system’s 
efficiency can be anticipated by its three constitutive parts: policy measures and programs; 
technological institutional infrastructure; and control mechanisms for monitoring system 
performance. The first HITRA programmes included the development of commercially 
promising products and services from research organizations, prior to their commercial 
stage, and a programme for the development of knowledge-based companies, aimed at both 
entrepreneurs and scientists. These programmes were subsequently upgraded and extended 
by a number of other innovation supporting programmes, of which the Proof of Concept 
(PoC), introduced in 2010 with the aim of ensuring pre-commercial capital for the techni-
cal and commercial testing of innovation concepts, was the most successful.
Public administration designed HITRA rather ambitiously, tasking it with motivat-
ing scientific research to foster science-industry cooperation, reviving industrial R&D, 
and encouraging the commercialisation of research results in order to support competi-
tion within the economy (Švarc 2011). This phase of UTT development can therefore be 
treated as innovation-driven technological policy—at least, when “good intentions” are 
considered.
However, the reality of HITRA’s programmes in practice presented many obstacles 
which prevented this innovation-based model of UTT from achieving its full potential. 
First of all, HITRA was faced rather early on with a lack of “systemic” innovation policy 
(Kuhlmann 2001). Many projects are obstructed by the deficiencies of the remaining parts 
of the innovation system, which are beyond the sphere of research and beyond the scope 
of HITRA itself; for example the lack of a sound policy concerning intellectual property 
protection, lack of venture and risk capital, absorption capacities of companies, etc. The 
Croatian government has not undertaken sufficient efforts to promote innovation policy at 
a national level, nor coordinated and harmonised the different ministries’ efforts towards 
technological development. Nonetheless, the “division of work” and competences between 
the line ministry of science and the economy have persisted. The fact that technology trans-
fer processes imply that functional, organizational, disciplinary, or national and cultural 
boundaries need to be spanned was overlooked.
On the other hand, the mind-set of leading politicians and intellectuals did not change 
much in terms of understanding innovation as an interactive process, embedded primar-
ily in firms. However, the linear process, which has been the dominant approach since the 
1970s, persisted as they failed to understand that technology transfer is based on a multi-
channel interactive model which does not necessarily involve R&D, and that innovation 
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is primarily linked to firm-based learning and knowledge acquisition in the production 
process (engineering, testing, marketing, organisation), while explicit R&D and links to 
research institutions is only a small part of these activities, if any (OECD 1998).
Innovation systems and policies have thus developed within the wide framework of sci-
ence policy, and yet have only occupied a peripheral position due to the strong resistance 
of the scientific community towards the “commodification of science”, and their efforts 
to preserve the traditional role of science as an “ivory tower”. The majority of scientists 
have resisted change, particularly with regards to scientific commercialization rather than 
to scientific ethos and principles. Studies of science-industry cooperation in Croatia have 
revealed rather weak connections between these sectors (Vehovec and Radas 2006; Radas 
2006; Jeleč Raguž and Mujić Mehičić 2017) as well as weak entrepreneurialism in Croa-
tian universities (Dabić et al. 2016).
The elitist approach to science and the focus of industrial policies on privatization and 
FDI, which ignored engineering, applied sciences, and technologies, has hampered the rec-
ognition of innovation and technological transfer as the driving force of economic growth. 
For these reasons, HITRA remained fragmented initially, unable to spur knowledge-based 
growth as its main task. By 2013, when the government initiated major reforms of the 
research and science development (R&SD) system, all HITRA programmes were termi-
nated. Despite its termination, HITRA had an irreversible influence on the management of 
research projects, and brought socio-cultural changes with it, enabling a shift from conven-
tional science policies towards policies that promoted entrepreneurial spirit and knowledge 
transfer activities in the academic community.
This second phase of innovation policy, which lasted from 2001 to 2010, despite defi-
ciencies, marks the “golden age” of the innovation system. During this decade, the national 
innovation system (NIS) had become a relatively complex system of supporting pro-
grammes, infrastructures, and policy documents for improving innovation dynamics and 
technology transfer (Švarc 2011). New institutions, such as the Croatian Institute for Tech-
nology which develops technology forecasts and strategies, and the Technological Council 
of the Ministry of Science and Education which provides grants for applied research and 
technological projects, were established by the mid-2000s. New funds to support knowl-
edge and technology transfer were founded in the period between 2005 and 2009, such as 
the Unity Through Knowledge Fund (UKF), the Science and Innovation Investment Fund, 
and the Partnership programme for the science/industry cooperation of the Croatian Sci-
ence Foundation. The landscape of interface institutions for technology transfer and inno-
vation development was significantly extended in the coming years, with new centres for 
technology transfer emerging at universities, as well as technology and innovation centres 
and parks supported by local communities.
Thanks to the EU Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), activated in Croatia in 
2007, the large infrastructure—the Biosciences technology commercialisation and incuba-
tion centre (BIOCentre)—was supported with over €18 million, and the Centre began oper-
ation in September 2015. The first (and, to this day, only) Science and Technology park at 
a university was established by the University of Rijeka (StepRi)4 in 2008, with the support 
of the then BICRO’s programme for technological infrastructure development (TEHCRO). 
The Science Park and the engagement of the University of Rijeka with the local economy 
4 http://www.step.uniri .hr/o-nama.
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made this university almost the ideal entrepreneurial university: striving to implement a 
triple helix model of the industry-science-government relationship in practice.
Higher education attainment levels at present are generally on the rise in the EU and 
Croatia, and this trend is clearly to be welcomed, given the fast-evolving knowledge econ-
omy challenges that are being faced (Dabic et al. 2015) (Table 1).
Seeking to increase entrepreneurship in the Faculties of Economics and Business in 
Zagreb, Faclty of Economics and Tourism “Dr. Mijo Mirković” in Pula and Faculty of 
Economic in Split, Croatia implemented project “Fostering Entrepreneurship in Higher 
Education” (FoSentHE), which was granted by the European Commission. The FoSentHE 
project was dedicated to the promotion of entrepreneurship amonsg students and to the 
generation of interest in scientific commercialization (Dabic et al. 2012).
5.3  Present state: Europeanization of technology transfer policies and practices
From 2010 onwards, the innovation system landscape was gradually reshuffled and, by 
2013, almost all institutions and programmes launched during the “golden age” were termi-
nated. The Ministry of Economy took over programmes for technology transfer in place of 
the Ministry of Science and Technology, marking a new era in innovation policy and UTT, 
which were traditionally under the auspices of the Ministry of Science and Education.
In 2013, the government initiated major reforms of the R&SD system with regards to 
funding, organizing, and evaluating scientific work to improve scientific excellence. The 
reform marked the end of Croatia’s innovation system, which had been building since the 
mid-1990s from a grounding focus on research activities and the supply-side of the innova-
tion process.
As a result of the budget austerity policy, the reform included serious cut-offs of the 
funds for scientific projects between 2013 and 2016. The reforms coincided with Croatia’s 
entry into the EU in July 2013, which granted access to the European Structural and Invest-
ment Funds (ESIF) and allowed for the adoption of Smart Specialization Strategy (S3) as a 
pre-conditionality for using ESIF. Policy makers believed ESIF would serve to substitute a 
large portion of the scarce budget resources. Innovation policy and technological transfer in 
Croatia has become, like in other EU countries, largely determined by the common Euro-
pean strategy of research and innovation (Dabić et al. 2015). ESIF, as a critical source of 
funds for R&D in Croatia, which significantly surpasses the national funding abilities for 
research activities, brought not only money but also its scientific policy (research priorities, 
Table 1  Population by educational attainment level, tertiary education (levels 5–8), and age (%). Source: 
Eurostat, online data code (edat_lfse_03)
Age/GEO 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
From 25 to 64 years
 European Union (28 countries) 23.5 24.2 25.1 25.9 26.8 27.7 28.6 29.3 30.1 30.7
 European Union (27 countries) 23.6 24.3 25.2 26 26.8 27.8 28.7 29.3 30.1 30.8
 Croatia 15.8 16.2 17.2 18.6 18 18.5 19.8 21.3 22.7 23
From 25 to 34 years
 European Union (28 countries) 29.9 30.9 32.3 33.3 34.4 35.5 36.4 37.2 37.8 38.2
 European Union (27 countries) 30 31 32.3 33.4 34.5 35.6 36.5 37.2 37.9 38.3
 Croatia 17.8 19.9 21.3 25.8 24.4 23.6 27.3 31.9 30.8 32.8
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goals and purpose of research, and financial priorities) as pre-determined by the S3. It led, 
as Kuhlmann (2001) expected, to the “post-national” innovation systems striving towards 
centrally mediated policy-making. S3 has not only made dramatic changes, but has signifi-
cantly affected both innovation policy previously determined by the National Innovation 
Strategy, 2014–2020, and science policy, which was defined in the Strategy for Education, 
Science, and Technology, 2014–2020.
Fostering innovation became a strategic goal of the EU in the mid-1990s (Oslo Manuel_
OECD 2005; OECD/European Commission 2004), as Europe experienced growing unem-
ployment, economic stagnation, and fierce competition from the USA, Japan, South Korea, 
and China. European innovation policy has gradually evolved from the instigation of the 
“research triangle” of the Lisbon agenda (integration of innovation, science, and higher 
education policies) towards the Smart Specialization Strategy (Foray et al. 2009) formu-
lated in the Europe 2020 Strategy. S3 was primarily developed as a central element of the 
new European cohesion policy, which should have enabled all EU countries, especially 
those less developed, to follow their own path of development. Cohesion policy within the 
Smart Specialization Strategy is no longer based only on inclusion into the ERA (European 
Research Area) framework programmes, which is featured by the frustratingly low partici-
pation of innovation followers and mainly serves the interest of the most developed coun-
tries (Švarc et al. 2013a, b). Innovation followers are also no longer supposed to impartially 
copy innovation supporting instruments, which usually achieve weak or negligible success 
in the recipient county.
The Smart Specialisation Strategies Initiative (RIS3) was therefore launched by the 
European Union as a new approach to economic development, based on the targeted sup-
port of R&D activities and innovation. It set the strategic directions for the development 
of R&D activities in the forthcoming period. The Croatian Smart Specialisation Strategy 
development is coordinated by the Ministry of Economy, Entrepreneurship, and Crafts 
(MEEC), who drafted the analytical background for the S3 with the support of an EU co-
funded expert team. The Smart Specialisation Strategy was adopted by the Croatian gov-
ernment on 30th March 2016.
S3 preserved the basic idea of science/industry/government cooperation but on differ-
ent premises which allowed different countries to specialise in their own specific sectors, 
depending on their capabilities. In contrast to previous innovation policies, which followed 
a centralized top-down approach, the S3 strives to identify research and technology areas 
for public interventions based on the analysis of the strengths and potential of the local 
economy through the Entrepreneurial Discovery Process (EDP), which is led by local 
entrepreneurs. This “strengthening of the strengths” policy focused on entrepreneurs and 
designed cohesive policies that would encourage regional development and SMEs in tech-
nologically peripheral countries in the EU. This has evolved over time into a new industrial 
and innovation policy for regional development all over the EU (Radošević 2018).
It is commonly perceived that the EU Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF), with a 
fund of €10.68 billion for the period 2014–2020, provided Croatia with the remarkable 
opportunity to address their needs in research, innovation, and skills. It makes €1.5 billion 
per year (World Bank 2012), over 3% of GDP on an annual basis, and about ten times as 
much as it did from 2007 to 2013 (European Commission 2015). Of these funds, €646.79 
million is used with the intention of strengthening the economy by applying research and 
innovation, as determined by the budget of the Operational Programme “Competitiveness 
and Cohesion”, 2014–2020.
ESIF provides funds for thirteen centres for scientific excellence, the new organization 
forms of scientific research, and is going to provide resources for the revitalization of many 
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research infrastructures, including large ones such as the Institute Ruđer Bošković, Faculty 
of Electrical Engineering, and university hospitals.
Pre-structural and structural funds have already provided several important grant 
schemes to support the industrial application of research results and facilitate knowledge 
transfer from the research sector to the industry sector by strengthening capacities for 
research, development, and innovation, or increasing the development of new products and 
services as a result of research and development. In contrast to scarce national resources, 
the ESIF provides meaningful funds for technology transfer activities. One of the most 
important grant schemes, for centres of competencies, is expected to contain over €100 
million.
Despite this, there are many new programmes for strengthening the innovation and pro-
duction capacities of SMEs which do not involve research-based activities. These include 
“Competence of SMEs” or “Innovation of the newly established SMEs”, which has sub-
stituted the previous nationally devised programme; and “Business impulse”, which was 
administered and funded by the Croatian government. On the initiative of the government, 
thirteen competitiveness clusters have been established to provide sector-specific synergies 
to increase national competitiveness (Anić et al. 2018). Although their role is still rather 
limited, they are expected to be integrated into the Innovation Network for Industry, and to 
have an active role in the overall national innovation system.
With regards to the policy framework for entrepreneurial learning, the years of efforts of 
the Ministry of Economy, Entrepreneurship, and Crafts to establish an entrepreneurial edu-
cation system are yet to provide tangible results. As a result, educational attainment levels 
of the population have improved significantly.
The following tables provide an overview of the overall indicators relevant to entrepre-
neurship and the business sector (Table 2).
Governance for smart specialisation requires strategic capacities and operational juris-
diction to grasp future opportunities, mainly in order to align policy actions, build critical 
mass, develop a vision, and implement a strategy with respect to the overall EU surround-
ings (Fig. 1).
For S3, the implementation of action plans for the most relevant investments will be 
funded under the European Regional Development Fund Operational Programmes (ERDF-
OP) Competitiveness and Cohesion (OP CC) through two priority axis: Priority Axis 1—
Strengthening the economy through the application of research and innovation, which will 
focus on research, technological development, and innovation; and Priority Axis 3—Busi-
ness Competitiveness, which will provide support for small and medium-sized businesses 
(SMEs). In parallel, through the ESF-OP Efficient Human Resources (OP EHR), a signifi-
cant contribution will be provided for S3 implementation in the field of smart skills.
The Entrepreneurial Discovery Process (EDP), as its essential component, used the 
cooperation of regional stakeholders to identify strategic areas of public investment into 
the technology and economic competitiveness of SMEs. Universities occupied a critical 
role as the regional innovation hub and “intellectual” base for local companies’ develop-
ment through technology and knowledge transfer, allowing them to upgrade their techno-
logical skills and competences. It seems that the implementation of S3 has finally pointed 
UTT in the right direction, and it marks two important milestones: firstly, the beginning 
of a new innovation ecosystem with a stronger focus on companies’ needs and regional 
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development, complemented by entrepreneurial culture and spirit; and secondly, the scien-
tific community’s efforts to embrace cooperation with companies through knowledge and 
technology transfer, something that was avoided for almost 30 years.
However, the process of building S3 in Croatia saw the principles of EDP adhered to 
only in part. The participation of stakeholders, especially those from science and busi-
ness backgrounds, in the formulation of priorities for the technology transfer from uni-
versities to local businesses is rather formal (Mršić 2018). This simply means that organic 
links between stakeholders in formulating regional technological needs, and the subse-
quent submission of cooperative projects for ESIF funding based on common interest and 
importance for the local economy, are harder to find. On the contrary, project activities 
are mainly driven by the bureaucratic requirements of ESIF operative programmes and the 
“rules of the game” with regards to project submission, evaluation, and funding. Moreo-
ver, initiatives for project submissions regularly come from research organizations as com-
panies are more focused on simply surviving and are less interested in knowledge trans-
fer from universities. It is presupposed that “isomorphic mimicry” (Radošević 2018) will 
occur, in which EDP only imitates the interaction between the business and research com-
munity with the aim to “collect the free money”. The fundamental question is not whether 
such imitations will occur, but in what proportion in relation to projects driven by authentic 
mutual interests. It seems that, at the moment, technology transfer within ESIF operational 
programmes is just another top-down “bureaucratic” incentive (this time coming from the 
EU and not from the national administration) for science-industry cooperation. The only 
difference this has in comparison to previous government initiatives is access to larger 
Fig. 1  Governance system for the S3. Source: The smart specialisation strategy of the Republic of Croatia, 
the Ministry of economy, entrepreneurship and crafts (MEEC)
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amounts of ESIF resources, which can support bigger projects which may have greater 
potential impact on the economy if cooperation is efficient.
There are also fears that absorption of ESIF will be sub-optimal because of insufficient 
administrative capacity, burdensome procedures, and a limited number of ready-to-imple-
ment projects, as identified in the Recommendation on the National Reform Programme 
(CEU 2016). Besides, low technological capacities of companies and the structure of the 
industry could yield little convergence with the EU (Bonaccorsi 2016; Muscio et al. 2015; 
Archibugi and Filippetti 2011). Such sub-optimal use of ESIF has already been seen in 
Greece (Liargovas et al. 2016), a country with which Croatia shares many obstacles when 
using ESIF, such as inefficient administration, corruption, and the declining competitive-
ness of economy.
Because of the aforementioned limitations, the Strategy for Entrepreneurship Develop-
ment in the Republic of Croatia, 2013–2020, plans to fulfil the strategic goal of improv-
ing overall economic performance by enhancing the economic performance of small busi-
nesses in the manufacturing and service sectors. This will be accomplished through more 
investment into R&D, higher degrees of innovation, growth in exportation, and further 
development of business networks and connectivity.
The main indicators for business performance are presented in Table 3.
Due to poor performance, several policy measures from the Ministry of Economy, 
Entrepreneurship, and Crafts have been introduced, striving to improve SME competitive-
ness by ensuring that the relevant standards for export production are met. In light of these 
measures, SME value started to recover in 2013, ultimately rising by 8% between 2012 and 
2015.
In 2016, the Ministry of Economy, Entrepreneurship, and Crafts published a call for 
increasing the development of new products and services arising from R&D activities”—
a programme to support business research and innovation (R&I) as well as cooperation 
with the public R&I sector, funded by ERDF, which focuses on developing new products, 
services, and technologies, and improving business processes by increasing their collabora-
tion with science and research institutions. The total budget for the period between 2014 
and 2020 amounted to €205 million (€100 million for the first phase in 2016, with an addi-
tional €105 million for the second phase in the final quarter of 2017).
6  Discussion: many actions, slim results
Despite almost 20 years of practising innovation policies, many indictors reveal that Croa-
tia has not progressed much in the economy, in technology, or in innovation during the 
last decade. On the contrary, the most recent analyses show that the Croatian economy is 
less competitive than its peers. There is a worrying trend which shows a general “lagging 
behind” of the countries of the former Soviet Union, which were behind Croatia in the era 
of socialism. In the last couple of years, Croatia can be seen to lag behind not only Hun-
gary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia, which used to be Croatia’s peers, but also 
behind countries such as Bulgaria and Romania, which have always been behind the rest of 
Europe. It seems that these countries too will soon leave Croatia behind.
This simply means that Croatian development policies in general, and innova-
tion policies in particular, for both research-based and non-research-based innovation, 
have simply been wasted efforts to spur the economic development and competences 
of entrepreneurs. The Croatian innovation system is widely perceived to be inefficient, 
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characterised by fragmentation, subscale investments, and poorly defined policies 
(European Commission 2015).
Investments by Croatian companies in R&I remain rather low, reaching only 0.38% 
of GDP in 2016. This is the second lowest investment level among EU countries, second 
only to companies in Romania, who invested less in 2016. Public expenditure on R&I 
amounted to 55.2% of GERD, while business expenditure on R&D (BERD) amounted 
to 44.8% of GERD. Private companies also contributed 8.4% of their total funds to R&I 
activities in universities, and 8% of their funds to the governmental R&I sector. Sci-
ence-industry cooperation with regards to technological and economic change is rather 
modest, characterised by a “downwards path” limited to standardised services, meas-
urements, and quality control, instead of an “upwards path” focused on the develop-
ment of new high-tech products and processes. Croatian companies invest only €42 per 
inhabitant, which is nine times less than the EU average. Business investment in R&I is 
concentrated in only a small number of sectors, including—pharmacy (34%), communi-
cations equipment (13%), and motor vehicles (10%).
It is worth mentioning that a rich landscape of over 350 business-supporting institu-
tions (e.g. business incubations, entrepreneurial zones, etc.), complemented by a num-
ber of supporting programmes intended to increase the innovation capacities of SMEs, 
turned out to be of modest efficiency. According to the latest GEM report (Singer et al. 
2018), Croatian companies mainly invested in technological infrastructure (e.g. machin-
ery), while new product investments were scarce: 72% of newly established companies 
and 83% of “old” companies did not produce “new to the market products” in 2017. 
This means that Croatian companies belong to the “red ocean”, in which competitors 
fight for dominance in the markets of known products, as opposed to the “blue ocean”, 
where demand is created by new products.
Technology transfer polices and policies for fostering entrepreneurship have followed 
a different evolutionary path, both from an institutional and conceptual point of view. 
Entrepreneurship has developed, as described in Sect. 2 according to two plans (tycoon 
privatization and creation of traditional SME sector), which both followed their inter-
nal development logic and dynamics and largely ignored entrepreneurial innovation 
and new technologies. On the other hand, technology transfer has manly focused on the 
capitalization of science and research-based innovation, not taking into account the real 
needs of entrepreneurs. An attempt to merge these sectors into a single process took 
place rather recently through the Europeanization of research and technology transfer 
policy, determined by the concept of S3 and implemented through the bureaucratic rules 
and requirements of the ESIF Operational programmes.
The consequence is a concentration of R&D activities within the private business 
sector in only several large multinational companies, such as PLIVA (pharmaceuticals), 
Ericsson Nikola Tesla (ICT), Podravka (food industry), and Končar Electrical Engineer-
ing Institute (electrical engineering). Medium and large enterprises fund more than 90% 
of private investments in R&D, with the highest portion of large enterprises investing in 
more than 60% of R&D investments. Less than 8% of private investments in R&D come 
from micro and small enterprises, which is demonstrative of their lack of engagement in 
R&D activities (OPCC 2014). Innovation potential in production sectors stems primar-
ily from technological mastering and business sophistication in SMEs in medium–low 
and medium–high tech sectors, which consists of approximately 48% of a total of 11,560 
SMEs in the manufacturing sector. Another 4.6% (more than 500 firms) are classified as 
high-tech (MEC 2013).
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There are a number of nascent high-tech companies which have emerged in recent years, 
such as Genos and Genera in biomedicine, Pet minuta (5 min) in e-business, and Rimac in 
electrical car manufacture. It is worth mentioning the prominent rise SMEs in the IT sector 
(Bellabeat, MSAN group, Combis, IN2 group, etc.) which has, since 2013, become one of 
the 12 largest export branches of the Croatian economy. However, this small sector of com-
panies does not compensate for the lost competences of the large amount of companies that 
collapsed throughout the 1990s.
The position of Croatia in terms of its international ranking for innovation, business, 
and competitiveness is rather low, despite its investments over the past few years, its efforts 
in creating more friendly business environments (e.g. lower minimum capital for start-up 
companies, reducing notary fees, etc.), and its environment for innovation. Its rank in the 
Ease of Doing Business indicator in the World Bank’s Doing Business report (World Bank 
2016) fell to the 51st position in 2017 from 43rd in 2016. The Global Innovation Index 
ranked Croatia in 41st place in 2017, which was an improvement on its ranking in 2016, in 
which it was 47th. However, Croatia’s Market Sophistication and Business Sophistication 
indicators are still relatively weak (Croatia occupies 88th and 53rd position respectively). 
Its ranking for Ease of Starting a Business significantly declined (from 64th in 2016 to 76th 
in 2017) after the improvement recorded in 2016; and Ease of Getting Credit also showed 
a negative trend, as Croatia took 67th position in 2017, having fallen from 63rd position in 
2016 (GII 2017). The Global Competitiveness Report, 2016–2017 (GCR 2016) indicated 
a similar performance: Croatia’s overall ranking was 74th (out of 138 countries), with the 
lowest ranking being for its Innovation and Business Sophistication sub index (92nd). 
These factors overall influence the weak innovation performance of Croatia, which ranks 
26th out of 28 EU Member States according to the European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS 
2016). See Fig. 2.
Croatia is a moderate innovator amongst the EU Member States and performs below 
the EU average in all innovation dimensions except two (EIS 2016). These are human 
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resources—Croatia is a leading country among the Member States in terms of its per-
centage of young people with upper secondary education—and non-R&D innovation 
expenditure as a percentage of the total turnover of companies. However, in tertiary 
education attainment (see Sect. 3) and business R&I expenditure, Croatia lags behind 
the EU average.
It is commonly believed that that the Croatian economy is locked into the low and 
medium technological growth model, and that one of the reasons for this (or perhaps 
as a consequence of this) is low investment in R&I, particularly in the business sector. 
Croatia has experienced a downward trend in R&D investments for more than a dec-
ade. According to Eurostat’s latest data (March 2019), the total gross domestic expend-
iture on R&D (GERD) amounted to €402.3 million (0.86% of GDP) in 2016, which 
represented an absolute annual increase on €374.8 million in 2015 (0.84% of GDP). 
Public expenditure on R&I amounted to 55.2% of GERD while business expenditure 
on R&D amounted to 44.8% of GERD. Investments in R&I in Croatia have experi-
enced a downward trend for more than a decade (in 2004, GERD amounted to 1.3% of 
GDP) but, in recent years, the trend has been stagnant, which is insufficient to enable 
Croatia to catch up with more advanced economies. Overall, R&I intensity in Croatia 
is significantly below both the 2.03% EU average and the national target of 1.4% set by 
the 2013 Economic Programme of Croatia. As such, the sustainability of R&I funding 
for Croatia is expected to come mainly from ESIF from 2014 to 2020.
Liberalization of economy, market competition, privatization of companies, EU 
membership, and other benefits resulting from the collapse of socialism have not 
brought with them the expected socio-economic progress anticipated in the first 
enthusiastic decade of the transition to capitalism. The reasons behind this slug-
gish economic development, in which technological transfer was largely absent, are 
still the subject of bitter disputes. Economists mainly blame the wrong (neoliberal) 
growth model, based on financialization and excessive servitization of the economy 
(Radošević 2013), as well as classic obstructive elements, such as lack of managerial 
and strategic competences and entrepreneurial skills, strong national currency, or enor-
mous bureaucracy and red tape.
Sociologists believe that inherited cultural factors, such as egalitarianism (Vuković 
et  al. 2017), and socio-political trajectories known as the state of semi-modernism. 
Processes of de-industrialization, re-traditionalization, de-scientization, and irrational 
administration (Županov 2001) have resulted in the cognitive, social, and political ina-
bility of political elites to accept global transformations as necessary for global inno-
vation-driven growth (Švarc 2006, 2017). Industrial and technological policies have 
largely been associated with the mere transition to market economy and the privatiza-
tion of companies, while technological developments have not been taken into account.
Finally, political economists are more prone to finding obstacles in incorrect politi-
cal systems, such as the “dependent market capitalism” (Nölke and Vliegenthart 2009) 
of the less developed countries in the European periphery. In Croatia, this specific type 
of crony capitalism was established during the first decade of transition. The character-
istics of crony capitalism were described by Franičević and Bićanić (2007), and consist 
of systemic corruption and clientelism, which permeate all segments of economy and 
society, and divert companies’ focus from innovation and export-oriented businesses 
towards political protection and support from interest groups to help sustain their busi-
ness and their own prosperity (Švarc 2017) .
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7  Implications
The implications of the given analysis are rather straightforward. Croatia urgently needs 
to recover its economy and to accelerate its integration with the EU. The entrepreneurial 
innovation and UTT are essential components of this process but are not sufficient and 
self-sustained. They are currently well supported within the framework of S3 and ESIF 
funds and both sides (scientific community and entrepreneurs) should take advantage of 
this European support and assistance. Seeking to increase the proper use of funds, the pol-
icy-maker should understand how the system of cooperation operates and how it functions 
in practice to avoid bureaucratic implementation of the ESIF programmes and adminis-
trative allocation of the funds. The organic interest among stakeholders should be found 
and exchanged for formal implementation of the programmes involving only administra-
tive “business as usual” procedures (calls, evaluation, funding). In this line, more effort is 
needed from the local, regional, and national authorities to coordinate the entrepreneurial 
discovery process and to spur entrepreneurial innovation. More coordination is required in 
order to identify and implement ambitious joint projects and the strategic entrepreneurial 
innovation of broader economic interests or grand challenges. The inclusion of Croatia in 
the global value chains is wholly neglected in the innovation policies; however, other coun-
tries, such as those of Visegrad (Slovakia, Poland Hungary, Czech Republic), based their 
success precisely on their inclusion in the global value chains (GVC) (Grodzicki 2014). 
Research into the policy mix for technology and innovation upgrades through the variety of 
forms for GVC could be a fruitful future policy orientation (Kergroach 2017).
The benchmark analyses of the Croatian economy provide clear evidence that support-
ing programmes, either for science/industry cooperation or for the business competitive-
ness of traditional SME, have not delivered the desired economic growth. Therefore, it 
is necessary to look beyond European programmes to diagnose the roots of slow growth. 
Many analyses, including this one, point out that economic recovery requires complex 
socio-economic transformations, which have been slowed down in Croatia by the lack of 
action taken towards “economic hygiene”, or “getting the fundamentals right” (OECD 
2001). The research implies that fundamentals, such as well-functioning markets, institu-
tions, governance, and favourable macroeconomic conditions, as described in the World 
Bank report (2013) and European semester (European Commission 2015), should be estab-
lished to raise Croatian competitiveness from last place in the EU.
The next policy actions involve fostering entrepreneurs, technology development, inno-
vation, and scientific research, which is needed to re-affirm Croatia on international com-
petitiveness and business scales. Because of the low technological capacities of firms, it 
would be useful to consider the unorthodox idea of the division of labour between public 
research and private businesses (Dosi et al. 2006) to allow both spheres to develop through 
their inherent logic and dynamics. The mastery of productive entrepreneurship, and its 
ability to create demand for R&D (Radošević 2006) and the entrepreneurship abilities of 
the population in general, should be strengthened on the “entrepreneurial pole” of the pro-
cess. The prerequisite is the completion of the privatization process of the state companies, 
as well as intensive efforts against crony capitalism as a phenomenon adverse to entrepre-
neurial innovation and technology development.
On the “science pole,” it is necessary to assure the sustainability of the scientific 
research system and the national knowledge base, which is a distinct process not crucially 
related to entrepreneurship. The concepts of entrepreneurial economy and the national 
entrepreneurial system point out that entrepreneurship and science can develop separately. 
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Entrepreneurial innovation does not necessarily involve R&D, while academics should be 
required to develop their “islands” of excellence,” cutting-edge research, and technologi-
cal frontiers to fulfil their social and economic role, which is a prerequisite for developing 
research-based entrepreneurial innovation.
8  Conclusions
This research analyses the evolution path of the UTT in post-socialist countries, using Cro-
atia as an example of this, with the aim of establishing whether or not the transition to capi-
talism and membership in the EU has enhanced UTT practices and related entrepreneurial 
innovation, and whether academic knowledge and research has filtered down to cultivate 
valuable economic activities and marketable innovation under these new circumstances.
The main contribution of the research is the identification of three models of UTT in 
transition countries using the longitudinal case study of Croatia: the science based model, 
which was practiced in socialism; endeavours towards an innovation based model during 
the transition period; and a bureaucratic UTT model, driven by the EU cohesion policy and 
access to the European Structural Funds. Insights into the evolution of these models sug-
gests the following three relevant conclusions.
Firstly, the sluggish economic growth and technological stagnancy of the country sug-
gest that there is no substantial difference in the efficiency of the different UTT models, 
which were in operation in different socio-political regimes. The proficiency of UTT was 
not improved during the switch from socialism to capitalism, nor through Croatia’s mem-
bership in the EU, and is thus shown to have little influence on entrepreneurial innovation. 
UTT continues to suffer from almost the same shortcomings nowadays as it did in the era 
of socialism and in its transitional period. Fragmentation of the innovation system, poor 
connections between science and business sectors, low technology and innovation capaci-
ties of companies, low business investments in R&D, technological obsolescence of equip-
ment, narrow technological trajectories, and the low interest of companies in innovation 
and cooperation within research sectors have all largely remained the same.
Secondly, the suppression of innovativeness, entrepreneurship, and competition, which 
would otherwise stimulate UTT, is still strongly present, although it is based on differ-
ent premises—primarily on the wrong growth model and crony capitalism. Sources of 
growth throughout a significant part of the transition were based on domestic consumption, 
defensive inter-sectoral restructuring (dismissal of workers or early retirement), and low-
technology foreign direct investments (FDI) (Lovrinčević and Teodorović 1998), instead of 
market competition, innovation, and technological upgrading. This model was not sustain-
able in the long run, and it led to poor market dynamism and a business environment that 
needed stimulation in the later stages of the development of its national competitiveness. 
This has contributed to the structural deficiencies of the R&D business sector in terms of 
low business investment in R&D and insufficient human resources for innovation dynamics 
within firms. Governance of innovations is often reduced to the buying of new machinery, 
incremental modifications, and products/processes which exclude risk taking and lead to 
low economic effect and non-export orientation. Negative effects also stem from the lack 
of transparency of corporate practices, and a close connection to state and authoritarian 
corporate management, which characterizes all periods of economic development, from 
socialism to the present day.
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Thirdly, the difficulties experienced throughout socialism, in terms of the practical 
application of research results and technological development, have not improved. The 
national innovation policy was launched in 2001 during the country’s transition into capi-
talism and, as a result of a lack of entrepreneurial innovation, the inability of businesses to 
bridge the gap between scientific research and its commercial application, narrow-minded 
policy-makers, and incorrect growth models, it has never come to function as it was hoped 
it would. This confirms the results of previous research (Staehr 2011), which state that, 
while EU membership has advanced democratic reforms, the effect on market-economic 
reforms has been either non-existent or negative.
The overall results suggest that, despite the dramatic change from socialism to capi-
talism, the basic mechanisms of economic functioning, such as state paternalism, lack of 
competition, private initiatives, and weak entrepreneurship, remain constant and produce 
modest improvements in the practices of UTT. Subsequently, sound action of the national 
government is needed to overcome economic and technological stagnation, and to exploit 
the benefits of the EU integration policies and ESIF.
The main limitation of this research refers to the qualitative methodology approach due 
to a lack of objective and systematized data for discussing the performance of technol-
ogy transfer and entrepreneurship policy. Although the longitudinal case study and quali-
tative interpretive approach is an excellent method for critical analyses and understudy-
ing how the national socio-economic and political context determines technology transfer 
and entrepreneurial innovation, a lack of statistical data and empirical information about 
R&D, innovation, and entrepreneurship limit the achievements and scope of this research. 
It mainly concerns a lack of systemized data about ESIF operational programmes (projects, 
stakeholders, beneficiaries, the share in national funds for R&D, etc.) The available inter-
national benchmarks and reports are not sufficient for efficient governance and the strategic 
coordination of innovation and entrepreneurship. A system of data collection, evaluation 
methods, and indicators should be established for diagnostic analyses (Edquist 2011), evi-
dence-based innovation policy (Gault 2018), and better leverage of European funds. There-
fore, future research should be focused on comprehensive empirical research and data 
collection concerning UTT, entrepreneurial innovation, and performance of the ESIF oper-
ational programmes, with a view to explore their influence on national entrepreneurship, 
innovation, and scientific potential, along with their inclusion into the global value chains.
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